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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9646
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000503

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [PINR](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [CG](#)
SUBJECT: NORTH KIVU HUNDE DISCUSSES RWANDOPHONIE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Samuel Brock for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: A North Kivu Hunde contact recently told us that both DRC President Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame want North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku to step down. While Nande do not oppose Paluku being replaced, they do not want a Rwandophone governor or vice-governor. The GDRC, in the opinion of our contact, had abandoned non-Rwandophones in the region, while, somewhat paradoxically, the Rwandan Government understands that it will be important to work with all ethnic groups in the province. The historically strong Nande-Hunde alliance has become even more tight in the face of increasing Rwandophone influence. Disgruntled, non-Rwandophone military elements may return to armed conflict, but our contact conceded this was not imminent. The CNDP, in a federal government shuffle, will most likely obtain several ministerial posts, as well as positions in the intelligence services, FARDC, and national police. End summary.

¶2. (C) We recently spoke with a North Kivu contact, a Hunde who had been involved in the Amani Peace Process. According to our contact, Rwandan Government influence in the Petit Nord continues to grow. Representatives from non-Rwandophone groups have reportedly become increasingly frustrated with what they perceive as GDRC indifference to crucial issues, e.g., integration and the North Kivu governor's post. In some cases, these representatives have apparently even traveled to Kigali to plead their case with the GoR.

¶3. (C) Despite his concerns, our contact stated that he is encouraged that "this time, the GoR appears to have learnt from experience," i.e., that it is in its own interest to include non-Rwandophones in positions of power in North Kivu. On the other hand, the GDRC and President Kabila, according to our contact, are either inactive on key issues (FARDC salary payment, non-Rwandophone discontent) or they support individuals with historical baggage, such as former North Kivu Governor Eugene Serufuli, who have aggravated the situation.

¶4. (C) Our contact said that North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku (a Nande) would be forced out of his position within 3-4 months. Both Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame want Paluku out, but Nande resistance in the provincial assembly has proven formidable. Our contact added that the Nande would also be glad to see Paluku out, but they are insisting that his replacement be Nande with a Hunde deputy. The Nande apparently oppose nominating a Rwandophone to either position.

¶5. (C) Unsurprisingly, our contact voiced opposition to any administrative division of North Kivu into a Petit Nord and Grand Nord. In addition to well-known Nande concerns about losing economic influence in the Petit Nord, our contact warned that Rwandophones could use their power base in the Petit Nord to eventually move more aggressively into the

Grand Nord. According to our contact, a visiting UK Government delegation recently raised the possibility of splitting up North Kivu (Comment: we have since ascertained that this was untrue. However, it does illustrate on-going paranoia in some circles that outside powers will somehow impose a re-drawing of the map. End comment).

¶6. (C) Turning to Nande-Hunde relations, our contact emphasized that the two groups had historically collaborated closely, primarily based on mutual distrust of the Hutus. Our contact maintained that community leaders, including military leaders such as LaFontaine and Janvier, believe Kabila has "sold North Kivu to the Rwandophones." He claimed some were "planning a new rebellion," but, when pressed, he conceded that armed opposition was not imminent.

¶7. (C) While the mass integration of CNDP and PARECO elements into the FARDC presented the GDRC with an enormous opportunity, our contact opined that Kinshasa had let any potential gains slip away simply through inattention to basics, i.e., payments of salaries, sufficient rations. According to our contact, many non-Rwandophones officers, including Janvier, have given up waiting on a FARDC commission and have instead "returned to the bush." Even LaFontaine, who publicly supported integration, is discontent. Lobbying from prominent Nande, such as Abbe Apollinaire Malu Malu and Paluku, has not helped LaFontaine.

¶8. (C) Regarding the CNDP, our contact said the new CNDP political party would most likely receive several posts in a new federal government, including 2-3 ministerial or

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vice-ministerial slots, as well as positions in the FARDC, intelligence service, and national police. Other groups would probably not receive any posts, but our contact did point to a burgeoning political alliance between CNDP and PARECO. Our contact claimed that Malu Malu and Minister for Regional and International Cooperation Raymond Tshibanda had recently discussed a request from Kagame to Kabila to find a position for Nkunda in the GDRC/FARDC.

¶9. (C) Comment: Our contact may be typical of those who worry they may be left out by the relative ascendancy, for now, of Rwandophones in North Kivu. While our contact opposes current trends and even fears them, he also is trying to position himself to benefit from the new order. He exuded a combination of pessimism (the GDRC has abandoned non-Rwandophones in the region) and optimism (the GoR understands that it must work with all the relevant actors in the region). His conflicting emotions are understandable as the new order in North Kivu does correspond to agreements that appear to have been worked out between Kabila and Kagame. As a result, some groups will in fact lose out in the new political, military and economic constellation in the province.
BROCK